



Most analysts agree that excessive money growth
causes inflation and that a primary goal of any
central bank should be to promote price stability.
Since the 1970s, the Federal Reserve has focused
on growth in monetary aggregates to fight infla-
tion. Unfortunately, the recent deregulation of the
financial system and innovations in financial
practices have made it more difficult to assess the
implications of growth in these aggregates for fu-
ture rates of inflation. As a consequence, both
last year and this year the Fed declined to specify
a target range for M1, the narrow transaction ag-
gregate it once emphasized in formulating policy.
The Fed also widened the target ranges for M2
and M3 in 1988 to reflect the greater uncertainty
in interpreting movements in these broader sav-
ings-type aggregates.
This Letter discusses the problems that deteriora-
tion in the reliability of the monetary aggregates
poses for the Fed in pursuing its objective of mov-
ing the economy toward price stability. As a
second-best solution to these problems, a condi-
tional forecast from an econometric model of the
u.s. economy could serve as an indicator of the
impact of policy actions.Such economic fore-
casts could be used in much the same way that
monetary aggregates and other intermediate tar-




tions and discount rate changes-do not have an
immediate impact on the economy, but instead,
influence it with a lag. Thus, if policymakers in-
tend to follow a discretionary policy, as opposed
to a fixed growth-rate rule, they need a tool, or
"intermediate target," that gives them feedback
on the future effects of today's actions. To be
helpful in this way, the intermediate target should
meet three conditions. First, it should have a reli-
able (predictable) relationship to the ultimate
goals of policy, such as future economic activity
and the price level. It also.should have a leading
relationship with these variables-that is,
changes in the intermediate target should pre-
cede changes in the price level, for example.
)
Finally, the intermediate target should be subject
to control by the Federal Reserve both in the
short run and the long run.
Real interest rates, for example, do not satisfy the
last of these criteria since the levels of real rates
vary along with changes in fundamental saving
and investment characteristics of the economy
and are only temporarily affected by monetary
policy. If the Fed were to try to hold a given inter-
est rate below (or above) its long-run equilibrium
value, the economy would become dynamically
unstable, swinging into accelerating inflation (or
deflation). In contrast, the Fed can determine the
level ofthe money supply in the long run, and
this will have long-run implications for the price
level and nominal GNP.
To measure the money supply, the Fed has em-
ployed three monetary aggregates-M1, M2, and
M3. M1, in particular, satisfied the criteria for an
intermediate target reasonably well until recently.
Its relationship with prices was relatively stable
most of the time, and it was subject to a reason-
able degree of control. Moreover, its movements
led movements in important macroeconomic var-
iables. The lag from changes in M1 growth to
changes in the growth of real GNP was around
six months, while the lag to inflation was about
1% to 2 years.
These lags from M1 growth to inflation meant
that a policy oriented around M1 automatically
looked forward. Changes in current values of M1
provided a forecast of future developments in the
economy. With respect to inflation, a change in
the rate of M1 growth of one percent, for exam-
ple, generally led to an equal change in the rate
of inflation 1Y2 to 2 years later. Thus a policy that
focused on current deviations between M1 and
its targeted values, in effect, also was focusing on
deviations between future inflation and an objec-
tive for future inflation.
Unfortunately, in recent years the relationship
between M1 and future economic developments
has deteriorated. The velocity of M1-the rate atFABSF
which it is spent and re-spent each year in gen-
erating GNP (measured at current prices)-grew
at a relatively steady 3 percent rate in the 1960s
and 1970s. But beginning in 1982, M1's velocity
became much less predictable, and has ended
up declining on balance since then. It appears
that the deregulation of deposit interest rates and
the introduction of new deposit instruments,
among other things, have changed the nature of
M1, and made it a less reliable intermediate
target.
Today, the broader aggregates-M2 and M3-
appear to be more reliable than M1, but still less
reliable than M1 once was. Recently, a number of
alternative indicators have been discussed, in-
c1uding,for example, commodity prices, the
monetary base (which includes reserves held at
the Federal Reserve banks and currency in cir-
culation), and M1A (which includes currency
and non-interest-bearing transaction deposits).
But while these indicators provide useful infor-
mation for monetary policy, it has not been
demonstrated that any of them has sufficient re-
liability to be the sale, or even primary, focus of
Fed policy.
Current data
In the absence of a highly reliable intermediate
target, it would be dangerous for policy to be
judged mainly on the basis ofthe current condi-
tion oftheeconomy. Primary reliance on current
data would be risky and could allow policy in-
advertently to wander off course. Assume, for
example,that over the course of ayear incoming
data on the economy suggested increasing
strength, and that the Fed in response gradually
tightened reserve availability, thereby raising in-
terest rates. Although the tightening of policy in
this situation might be appropriate, current eco-
nomic developments would not provide a gauge
for the correct degree of tightening needed over
the year. By the time the year was over, policy
might have been tightened too much or too little.
Since the feedback from real GNP and inflation
is slow to emerge, large mistakes can be made
before they are discovered.
A current-data approach also can lead topolicy
mistakes because the timing of the effects of pol-
icy actions is likely to IJe inappropriate. For
example, if policywere eased in response to a
weak current quarter, the effects might not be
felt until the economy already had begun to
strengthen. These timing problems are acute in
the case of inflation. For example, by the time the
actual data on inflation begin to show an in-
crease, the underlying inflationary pressures
already have been present for a year or more.
Thus, it would be too late to turn the inflationary
trend around without severe tightening and the
attendant high costs of lost output and em-
ployment.
"Targeting" a conditional forecast
Given the problems with the current-data ap-
proach, it is clear that an alternative approach to
policy needs to be forward-looking to take ac-
count of the lags in the effects of monetary policy
on the economy. In addition, a wide variety of
information on current and expected future eco-
nomic developments should be taken into ac-
count to compensate for the deterioration in the
information content of the monetary aggregates.
In lieu of a reliable monetary aggregate target,
these criteria may be best met by explicitly ori-
enting policy around information obtained from
conditional forecasts of inflation and other goal
variables. Using an econometric forecasting
model of the economy, growth paths can be esti-
mated for the monetary-policy instruments-
open-market operations and the discount rate-
to achieve the inflation objective.
Given the lags in policy, this objective would
need to be defined over a period covering one to
two years into the future. If the ultimate goal
were price stability, one most likely would want
to aim at gradual year-by-year reductions in in-
flation to mitigate adverse effects on employment
and output.
Of course, a forward-looking econometric model
can be used to estimate paths for the policy in-
struments that are consistent with achieving any
other policy objective, such as nominal income,
as well.
Once an inflation objective is chosen, an econo-
metric model could be used to make a number
of forecasts using different assumptions about the
paths for the policy instruments. The path that
generated the forecast consistent with the infla-
tion objective would be the appropriate path for
policy. The chosen estimates then would define
policy actions until the next policy meeting. The
conditional forecasts would need to be updatedas new information emerged, and thus the policy
setting would change over time.
Several types of models potentially could be
used. Models that process a wide variety of in-
formation seem the most useful today. Neo-
Keynesian-style structural models and vector au-
toregressions fall into this category, since both
types of models are capable of processing a wide
variety of information and attempt to represent or
mimic the dynamic structure of the economy. No
matter what type of model is used, though, pol-
icy makers still could adjust model forecasts
according to their own best judgments, just as
they could when policy was oriented around an
intermediate target.
This conditional forecasting approach, in fact, is
conceptually similar to using an intermediate
monetary target. The intermediate target in this
instance is the conditional forecast of inflation,
which in turn, is a function of all of the data
that are processed by the model. In effect, the
method involves targeting a forecast of future in-
flation, and requires the policy instrument to be
adjusted to keep the forecast of inflation equal to
the objective for inflation. If the forecast were
reasonably accurate, the change in inflation fore-
casted today would lead actual changes in
inflation in the future, in the same way that
changes in the growth of M1 used to lead
changes in inflation.
Accuracy of forecasts
It is well known that economic forecasting is not
an exact science-inevitably, errors are made.
Why, then, should the design of monetary policy
be entrusted to one- to two-year-ahead forecasts?
First, it is by no means obvious that forecasts into
the future are less accurate than current-quarter
estimates. Current-quarter data contain a lot of
"noise"-movements not related to changes in
economic fundamentals-that cancels out over
time. Thus the fundamentals tend to show
through more clearly over longer forecast
horizons.
A recent article in Challenge Magazine exam-
ined the accuracy of forecasts obtained from a
regular survey of forecasters conducted by Blue
Chip Economic Indicators from 1977 to 1986.
The one-year-ahead consensus forecasts of real
GNP growth were significantly more accurate
than the forecasts of current-quarter growth. For
current-quarter growth, the average (absolute) er-
ror for GNP was a huge 2.6 percentage points (at
an annual rate), whereas the forecasts made in
October for real GNP growth in the following
year had an error of only 1.0 percent. For infla-
tion, the error one-year ahead was 1.2 percent.
Unfortunately, the current-quarter errors for infla-
tion were not presented. However, forecasting
experience at this Bank suggests that the inflation
forecast errors over these two horizons are about
equal.
Second, and more importantly, short of basing
policy on a fixed rule, there is no choice but to
forecast, either implicitly or explicitly, because of
the lags in monetary policy. Since actions today
have little or no effect on results today, there is no
way to judge the thrust of today's policy by look-
ing at current economic performance. Reliance
on current numbers implicitly makes the ques-
tionable assumption that today's performance is a
good forecast of tomorrow's performance. Thus
the issue of forecast accuracy must be considered
in relative, not absolute terms. No matter how
large a model's forecast errors, if they are smaller
than the errors that would be made using current
data only, or intermediate monetary targets, then
the model should be used.
This discussion is not intended to downplay the
size of forecast errors that inevitably will be
made using econometric models. However, the
long lags from monetary-policy actions to infla-
tion make forecasting an essential part of effec-
tive inflation control. Given that simple forecast-
ing models (such as those based on intermediate
targets like the money supply) have deteriorated
in recent years, the best alternative appears to be
econometric models that process a wide range of
information and attempt to predict the future ef-
fects of policy changes on the economy.
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